1. Interruption of the talks between Aliraqiah list and State of law: After the Arbil agreement, which was attended by all the political blocs at the invitation of Mr. Masoud Barzani, the various parties sat at the round table to resolve crises that had arisen between the blocs. The talks were supposed to continue between the two blocs to bring about the implementation of the nine points that were agreed upon. Unfortunately, because of differences on details, these talks were cut off and turned later to tense statements between the two parties that led to a worsening of the situation.

ISCI considers that all blocs and political parties and movements participating in the political process must not override any detail that has been agreed upon, especially Arbil agreement. This requires all parties to sit at the round table again and this is a sincere call from ISCI to resolve problems and end the crisis. All must move away from personalization and operate on the principle of national partnership. Lifting the liabilities ceiling or reducing them will result in finding other problems that do not serve the political process and the national project.

2 - Delay in the naming of Security Ministers: This crisis still exists, and parties have not reached a solution acceptable to everyone because of the continued disagreements. These has meant the continued vacancies in the security and intelligence ministries. This in addition to the intersection of selection mechanisms for the placing of qualified people in these ministries.

ISCI sees that all political observers and leaders of the Iraqi security forces believe that the escalation of terrorist operations in the last period is due to gap caused by the differences between the blocs that have prevented the nomination of these ministers. This has made some of the leaders in these agencies and ministries develop a real fear of losing their sites because of their lack of accomplishments. There is also the fact that four ministries are run by Mr. Maliki, acting along with his cabinet and his position as commander of the Iraqi armed forces, and this is what makes the activity and the movement of these institutions slow. Because of the breadth of the issues that are subjected to his direct supervision.

3 - The extension of the security agreement: The disparity of views on this issue still exists in the political debate within the blocs and parties. It is between acceptance for the extension or the rejection. Those who believed that the case is subject to the opinion of military leaders, or those who see that this is up to the politicians to decide. These disparate views have not led to a decision and this is worrisome as the withdrawal date in on December 31, 2011. Without giving realistic justifications, both in terms of the internal security and securing the borders of the nation, the exact figures of the size of these forces and the interest of their presence in Iraq has led to the mudslinging between the sides as each has put the blame on the other.

We still believe that for foreign troops to stay we need to examine the opinion and assessment of military commanders. These assessments depend on accurate figures that have been studied very carefully. This confirmation is the prerogative of these agencies and they must submit them to the political leadership and then the parliament. After this the political leaders must decided whether they have been convinced to keep those forces or not.

4 - Hundred Days test: The views of the political blocs towards this initiative varied. Some of them see it as escape hatch for Mr. Maliki and some of them considered it as a lifeboat so that Mr. Maliki stays Prime Minister for a longer period. Some of them see it as something that has prompted ministers to speed up the completion of projects that have been assigned to them and others have said that it had uncovered bugs and indicated obstacles, and one sees the necessity of reducing the number of ministries.

ISCI believes in the need to reduce the number of ministries that make up the current cabinet. This reduction means that there will be a merger of some ministries. Those ministries that are similar in powers and scope. This approach will rid the government of the extra sites that cost the Iraqi state large sums of money. This is money which can be invested in economic, service, science, health projects. This is money that can be used to restore the infrastructure that is still suffering from no interest in it like the stalled factories that have a large numbers of employees who are paid, without providing any work.

5 - The deterioration of security: There is no doubt that the Iraqi street has seen in recent months an escalation of terrorist operations. Whether in Baghdad or in other provinces, as happened in the province of Saladin and Diyala provincial councils, and the process of targeting the house of the Governor of Diwaniya province. There are also instances of improvised explosive devices, and assassinations, causing a state of confusion in the internal situation of Iraq.

ISCI believes that the readiness of Military Intelligence is still below the level required to stop the deterioration of security and the thwarting of terrorist plans. Plans which have proliferated recently and are carried out by these terrorist operations in broad daylight. We call upon the Iraqi government to advance development and technology according to the latest methods of intelligence in the world in order to be able to perform its duties. We must clear Iraq of the enemies of the political process. We need to provide our security forces with technical skills, and base our security on national goals, and to rid the quota system that has come at the expense of the capacity and capabilities and technical expertise of the security services.

6 - Poor services and a high corruption index: The impact of the decline in providing services to the Iraqi people, both in terms of electricity, sanitation, clean drinking water and the ration card items, paving roads, street cleaning and other services has been dramatic. The increase in these services will restore confidence of citizens in their government. Along with the improvement of services we must also address the rampant corruption, the first disrupter to the completion of service projects and the first cause of the spread of unemployment among the youth of Iraq.
ISCI has stressed in more than one occasion, and before the formation of the government of national partnership that the government should be a service government, not a governing authority, that we need to be taking into account the rights of citizens and their right to live in dignity through the provision of necessary services that allow their daily living standards to be the highest priority. Any failure in this dynamic aspect will affect the citizens and will prevent them from participating in the upcoming elections,

7 - National Reconciliation shows that the national reconciliation project took a serious turn when it went off the tracks. We were the first to call for national reconciliation, but with conditions, we want Iraqis who believe in the new system and the political process. Those who opposed it during the previous years and took up arms against occupation forces have their hands stained with the blood of the Iraqi people who built a new Iraq. ISCI asks that we not resort to arms in the case of disputes between the blocs political, considering that Iraq for all Iraqis.