1-The lack of unity of the position on the exit of foreign troops:

There were various political forces on the exit of foreign troops from Iraq according to the agreement signed by the U.S. administration and the Iraqi government, The Kurds declared publicly that the current phase is not settled yet and it needs these forces to stabilize the current situation and that some of their officials declared the possibility of establishing bases for these forces in Iraqi Kurdistan, but they recently have stated and according to the minister of Peshmerga, that the region wants the departure of foreign troops on schedule and exit of last foreign troops from Iraq.

The Sadr movement has announced its rejection of the stay of foreign troops, or even military trainers and so they are skeptical about the credibility of the withdrawal process and confirm that this withdrawal will be partial.

Aliraqiah List does not have a unity of political speech that represents the common position. Some of them see the need for a full withdrawal, and some of them are calling for the need for trainers because that the Iraqi security services are in urgent need of these trainers to complete the readiness of security forces.

Sate of law list sees in accordance with head of the list, Mr. Nuri al-Maliki, the Prime Minister , who said that the existence of trainers is essential at this stage bit the list changed its position after the adoption of U.S. President Obama's decision to full withdraw.
We in ISCI and since the signing of the Convention and to this day have emphasized and still emphasize the need for the withdrawal of the troops from Iraq on schedule and confirmed also that the estimating the situation should not be politicized, and that the Iraqis are better able to safeguard their security, independence and sovereignty. So we call on all security leaders for the need to unify the vision of security and to avoid conflicting statements that have confused the Iraqi street.

2 -Politicization of the formation of regions:

The Iraqi Constitution stated in Part V "provincial authorities" and in Article 116 on "The federal system in the Republic of Iraq consists of the capital, the regions, non-central governorates, and local administrations".

In Article 119 it is stated that it's the right of each province or more to form a region based on a request for a referendum to be submitted in one of two ways:

1 Request by a third of the members of each of the provincial councils intending to form a region

2 Request by ten voters in each of the governorates intending to form a region
Iraq's constitution gives each province the right to form an administrative region not on national, sectarian, racial, political basis or other purposes harm this law and represents a departure from the Constitution.

The solution to this problem lies in expanding the powers of provincial councils, which were frozen by the extreme centralization, contrary to the spirit of Article 116, which provides for decentralization and gives full power to manage the provinces, and this led to a tendency by some to announce the formation of regions, as happened in the province of Salah al-Din, which came as a result of political background and emotional stresses not related to the Iraqi constitution in the formation of regions which cannot this be achieved unless it referred to the national partners, because otherwise it is considered extortion or promotion for a personal projects that will be doomed to failure.

We in ISCI stand with the Iraqi constitution, taking into account the appropriate timing and not on the basis of exciting crises to resolve the problems so we call on all Iraqi provinces to respect the principle of national partnership and work within the political consensus signed by the parties and must study this matter carefully and these provinces must distinguish between the constitutional right to form regions and between the mechanisms of implementation, which must take into account the sectarian, ethnic, and political contexts and make sure that it will not expose this sensitive stage to further crises and problems

3- Arrests:

The recent arrests that have targeted a number of Saddamists Baathists where some intelligence information stated that they were planning to stir up unrest and chaos in some governorates of Iraq after the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq to overthrow the political process and to return Iraq to the first square and the return of the dissolved Baath party to power. Such organizations and especially the Baath Party were banned by the Iraqi Constitution Article 7, which emphasizes:

First: Any entity or party that adopts racism, terrorism, ethnic cleansing or atonement, or anything that incites, facilitates, glorifies, promotes the work of such organization is banned , and this may not be part of political pluralism in Iraq, and shall be regulated by law.
Second: The State is committed to fighting terrorism in all its forms, and works to protect its territories from being a base or pathway or field for terrorist activities.

This law requires the State to arrest any element of the Baath party if there is evidence that approves his involvement in activities hostile to the political process and the new Iraqi state on the condition that these arrests do not violate the law provided in Article 7 of the Constitution. Many Iraqi politicians confirm that the security agencies infiltrated by the Baath and they see the need to clean these agencies from the remnants of the dissolved Baath Party this serious issue cannot be overlooked.

We in ISCI see that the security is a red line and there is no compromise with it and tolerance in this matter, and there is a need for the eradication of the cancerous cells of the Baath Party, and we demand institutional security policy based on intelligence work that subject reality to professional security work that reduces the margin of error. We also call on everyone to maintain the educational effort and the maintaining the political system in Iraq, and stand to stand against Saddamist and anyone who wants to target the Iraqi experience.

4. The absence of systematic building of a modern state:

The most important reasons for the success of a modern state, especially the new Iraqi state is the belief in state-building through consolidation of the national constants and to adapt to changes in practice, and there must be a methodology to everything in the state and its institutional configurations and put things in perspective and in their contexts, in other words, there is a need to consider the logic of the state, not the logic of the sector party, or the component which often lack the most basic elements of fairness and efficiency, and patriotism.
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5 Crises of confidence and the intersection of political discourse:

The political arena is overshadowed by mutual trust crisis between all parties, and this is what made ​​the interpretation of what is going on politically subject to doubts and think of others, which was a reason for some to pursue a political speech that intersects perfectly with any political speech issued by the other. And that all previously agreed upon may be subject later to delay and procrastinate, especially by the executive branch, which must implement what was agreed upon before the formation of the government.

We in ISCI believe that our reference in resolving all crises is the Iraqi Constitution and direct meetings between all parties ( a round table) to come up with common views that would lift doubts and suspicions and concerns, which occupy large areas in the political discourse, which raises the bar of the intersection and bickering, and accusations.